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1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the significant factors that affect
the long-term debt decision of U.S. casino firms. Long-term debt is a
major component of many casino companies’ capital structure. For
example, as of the end of the third quarter in 2009, MGM Mirage had
$12.9 billion in long-term debt (approximately 74 percent of total debt)
while Las Vegas Sands had $11.6 billion in long-term debt (approximately
84 percent of total debt) (CNBC, 2009). Thus, since long-term debt plays
a critical role in casino financing, a study of how casino firms make their
long-term debt decisions should be warranted.
Although a large body of work has been compiled about capital
structure, very little work involving the hospitality industry has been
completed and even less has been done with the casino industry
specifically. Some preliminary capital structure work was completed by
Kwansa, Johnson and Olsen (1987) for the hotel industry. Additionally,
some comparative studies have been completed with the hotel industry
and other types of industries (Gu, 1995/96; Sheel, 1994). Another study
by Kim (1997) examined potential determinants for restaurant firms.
Nevertheless, further investigation into this topic, particularly for the casino
industry, appears to be warranted.
One of the major features of the empirical financial literature is an
attempt to find a unifying theory of capital structure. However, as
discussed by Myers (2001), despite some forty years of research, it is
unreasonable to expect to find a “universal” capital structure theory soon,
if ever. More importantly, however, is the notion that although the existing
theories regarding capital structure cannot really be generalized, most
studies empirically test them across a large, heterogeneous sample. As
discussed by Myers (2001), testing in this manner can be uninformative, if
not misleading. As Myers points out, some research will show support for
two conflicting theories because each may be consistent with a particular
subsample of a large cross sectional database.
Capital structure can differ greatly even within apparently
homogenous industries. MacKay and Phillips (2005) find that leverage
varies more within an industry than between industries. Additionally,
much of the variation is firm specific. Another example applies to the
seemingly homogenous hospitality industry. Dalbor and Upneja (2002)
find a significant and negative relationship between long-term debt and
growth opportunities for restaurant firms, which is consistent with findings
by Barclay and Smith (1995). On the other hand, Upneja and Dalbor
(2004) find a significantly positive relationship between long-term debt and

growth opportunities for U.S. lodging firms. Although this relationship was
not expected a priori, there is some support for the direction and
significance of this relationship (Wald, 1999; Mooradian & Yang, 2001;
Tang & Jang, 2007).
Given the lack of capital structure research in the casino industry
specifically and the emerging trend in the literature towards industry
capital structure specificity, we continue our examination of the existing
literature regarding the three major theories of capital structure as outlined
by Myers (2001): Tradeoff theory, pecking order and free cash flow
theory. This paper is organized as follows. Section two will review the
relevant literature. Section three will present the hypotheses to be tested.
Section four will present our model and a discussion of our data sample.
Section five will present our results and section six will follow with a
discussion of the results and potential topics for further research.
2. Review of Literature
According to Myers (2001), capital structure theories can be divided into
three major areas: (1) the tradeoff theory; (2) the pecking order theory;
and (3) the free cash flow theory. The tradeoff theory states that interest
tax shields have value to the firm and will be used up to the point where
the marginal tax benefits of debt equal the costs of potential financial
distress. The pecking-order and free cash flow theories both involve the
management and minimization of agency costs between shareholders and
lenders and shareholders and managers. The literature has recently
seemed to lend greater support to the latter two theories as opposed to
the tradeoff theory.
Although the tradeoff theory was the first major attempt to explain
capital structure, it may only explain a portion of the capital structure
decision. For example, under the tradeoff theory, profitable firms would
always take advantage of interest tax shields. However, as discussed by
Myers (2001), there are many successful and profitable firms that have
little or no debt in their capital structures (Microsoft and Starbucks are just
two well-known examples). Additionally, Fama and French (1998) find no
evidence that interest tax shields contribute to the value of the firm.
Nevertheless, although it appears that the tradeoff theory of tax
benefits versus potential distress costs may not provide a comprehensive
explanation of debt choice, it does play some role in the amount of debt
issued. As an example, nondebt tax shields such as depreciation can
serve as a substitute for tax savings from interest. Firms may not want to
incur higher agency costs of debt because they can take advantage of

other types of tax shields (DeAngelo & Marsulis, 1980; de Miguel and
Pindado, 2001). Depreciation expense is one of these tax shields and is
often expressed as a percentage of assets (Titman & Wessls, 1988;
Chang, 2009). European firms with a significant amount of depreciation
were found to use less long-term debt by Wald (1999). These findings are
consistent with earlier research conducted by DeAngelo and Marsulis
(1980) and Mackie-Mason (1990).
However, the relationship between long-term debt and depreciation
could be indeterminate. As previously discussed, DeAngelo and Marsulis
(1980) show firms with nondebt tax shields use less debt. On the other
hand, there is an argument proffered by Wald (1999) that firms with
greater physical assets will show creditors that the firm is putting these
assets to use and thus, there could be a positive relationship between
long-term debt and depreciation (although land does not depreciate).
Thus, while Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984) find a positive relationship
between depreciation and debt, Mackie-Mason (1990) finds a negative
one.
When examining the lodging industry specifically, there is also some
contradictory evidence in regards to the relationship between depreciation
expense and the use of long-term debt. Upneja and Dalbor (2001) use a
sample of lodging firms (SIC 7011) for the years 1974 through 1997 and
find a significantly negative relationship between depreciation expense
(divided by total assets) and long-term debt. Dalbor and Upneja (2004)
use a lodging sample for the years 1981 and 2000 and find a negative but
insignificant relationship between the depreciation ratio to assets and
long-term debt. This contradiction may be due to time sensitivity or else
depreciation expense is related to investments in fixed assets which may
be more of a proxy for growth opportunities in the lodging industry.
The pecking-order theory as put forth by Myers (2001) describes the
preference of firms to minimize the various agency costs of debt and
equity by first using retained earnings, then debt and finally, outside
equity. Accordingly, as postulated by the pecking-order theory, risky firms
(with fewer retained earnings) will use more debt. This may be from the
fact that retained earnings are simply not available for use, and that the
agency costs of new external equity are too high. Debt subsequently
becomes the default financing choice. These costs may be too high as
there may be an information asymmetry problem whereby shareholders
worry that there is the potential for underinvestment—the failure to take
advantage of positive net present value projects. This positive relationship
between risk and debt is supported by the research of MacKay and
Phillips (2005) and de Miguel and Pindado (2001).

The pecking-order theory and free cash flow theories can become
enmeshed. The two theories both help explain the use of debt for firms
with growth opportunities. Growth opportunities are generally expressed
by comparing market values to book values in one form or another. Both
of the theories hypothesize that the choice of financing is used to minimize
the agency costs and are dependent upon the type of asset investment.
Given that the market value of the firm is expressed as the book value and
assets in place (tangible) and the market value of its growth opportunities
(intangible assets), these intangible assets can play a significant role in
the choice of financing.
If a firm has a significant amount of growth opportunities, there may
be an information asymmetry problem for lenders. Accordingly, the
agency costs of debt can become excessive. As discussed by Myers
(2001), debt can serve to “put firms on a diet” by forcing firms to pay out
cash in the form of interest and principal payments. Therefore, firms with
growth opportunities will not want to incur the extra agency costs and will
typically utilize less debt in their capital structures. Lenders may also be
less confident about the true value of such intangible assets. The
negative relationship between growth opportunities and debt was found by
Kim (1997) and Barclay and Smith (1995; 1999).
On the other hand, Wald (1999) obtains mixed results for his sample.
He finds a negative relationship between growth opportunities and debt for
U.S. firms. On the other hand, he finds a positive relationship between
debt and growth opportunities for Japanese, British, German and French
firms. Interestingly enough, the Japanese sample contains high growth
companies in construction and real estate development. Both of these
types of firms are arguably similar to hotel companies. Additionally, Myers
(2001) discusses survey research that finds high debt use by real estate
development industries.
Some research has already been completed that investigates the
relationship between debt and growth opportunities for the hotel industry.
Mooradian and Yang (2001) find a highly significant relationship between
leverage and market-to-book value ratios for REIT and non-REIT hotel
companies. Moreover, Dalbor and Upneja (2004) find a significantly
positive relationship between long-term debt and growth opportunities for
U.S. lodging firms. This finding was confirmed by research conducted by
Tang and Jang (2007).
Given the literature reviewed and discussed herein, it appears that
growth opportunities are not homogeneous and may vary across
industries. As previously mentioned, growth opportunities are typically
measured as the excess of market value above book value (Barclay and

Smith, 1999). Firms heavily involved in real estate development such as
hotels and casinos may have their growth opportunities more closely tied
to future investment in fixed, tangible assets (as opposed to intellectual
assets such as patents on pharmaceuticals). Accordingly, this may give
lenders a greater level of comfort in terms of the ability to assess the true
value of these growth opportunities, which could lower the agency cost of
debt. This may explain the positive relationship between leverage and
growth opportunities finding in hotel REITS and non-REIT hotels by
Mooradian and Yang (2001). Given that casino development often
involves hotel construction, we may expect that casino firms with greater
growth opportunities will use more long-term debt.
Based on the foregoing reasoning, fixed assets (such as property,
plant and equipment or PPE) should also be positively associated with
long-term debt. It may be such that lenders are more able to assess asset
values that are more readily observable and their values more easily
recoverable in a bankruptcy proceeding. As discussed by Vilasuso and
Minkler (2001), the capital structure of firms is also dependent upon asset
specificity and that firms will increasingly rely on equity financing as assets
become more difficult to the redeploy. A review of capital structure
literature by Marsh (1982) finds that firms with more fixed assets use more
long-term debt. Furthermore, a positive relationship between PPE and
debt is found by Wald (1999), de Miguel and Pindado (2001) and
Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001).
Investments in PPE can help a firm grow, but this growth could lead
to “empire building”. The literature survey by Marsh (1982) finds a positive
relationship between long-term debt and firm size. This directional
relationship is hypothesized in Jensen’s free cash flow theory (1986). As
firms grow, managers have more power as the number of assets under
their control increases. Accordingly, there may be “free cash flow”—cash
flows in excess of what is required to invest in positive net present value
projects. Therefore, interest and principal payments can help alleviate this
overinvestment problem for the firm. A number of papers have found a
positive relationship between firm size and the use of debt including
Chang (2009), Mackay and Phillips (2005), and Wald (1999). We would
anticipate a similar finding for casino firms.
3. Hypotheses to be tested
Given the theories from the literature previously discussed, we have
selected five research hypotheses related to the long-term debt of U.S.
casino firms:

H1: Casino firms with more nondebt tax shields (as measured by the ratio
of depreciation expense to total assets) will use less long-term debt.
H2: Long-term debt is positively related to casino firm risk.
H3: Casino firms with more fixed assets (property, plant and equipment)
will use more long-term debt.
H4: Long-term debt is positively related to casino firm size.
H5: Casino firms with more growth opportunities will use more long-term
debt.
Based on the foregoing, we have selected a dataset from which to
draw our observations and an appropriate methodology to test the
hypotheses. The variables used and the data are discussed in the
following section.
4. Data and methodology
The total sample for this study is all U.S. casino firms taken from the
COMPUSTAT database for the years 1987 through 2008. A list of all
casino firms used in shown in Table 1.
**insert table 1 here**
This list can be further divided into two subsamples by the North
American Industry Classification System (NAICS): Code Number 713210
(Casinos excluding hotels) and Code Number 72110 (Casino hotels). It
should be noted that not all firms are available for each year used
because of bankruptcies, mergers, companies going private or de-listings.
The maximum potential number of observations for the sample was 699.
However, due to circumstances previously described, the number of
observations used in the various regression models was less. Summary
statistics for the entire sample are shown in Table 2.
**insert table 2 here**
As shown in the summary statistics, the average long-term debt to
asset ratio is approximately 31 percent. The PPE ratio shows a mean
value of 63 percent, indicating the fixed-asset intensity of the industry as a
whole. The earnings to price ratio has a negative mean value, indicating
many firms have net losses in some years. The average market value of
equity to book value of equity is also negative; while the market value of
equity is censored at 0, some firms have negative equity on their balance
sheets.
The regression models used herein are based upon the three major
capital structure theories identified by Myers (2001): tradeoff, pecking
order and free cash flow. The static tradeoff model theorizes that firms

with more nondebt tax shields (such as depreciation) will borrow less as
these serve as a substitute for the interest tax shields.
The pecking order model theorizes that firms have a preference for
financing with retained earnings. However, risky firms tend to not perform
as well and have less retained earnings available for use. Therefore, we
hypothesize that risky firms will use more debt. Furthermore, the pecking
order theory hypothesizes that firms with greater growth opportunities will
not want to be constrained by debt covenants and borrow less. However,
research previously discussed has found the opposite and we believe this
is true for casino firms.
Finally, the free cash flow theory involves the use of debt to motivate
firm managers to manage investments properly. Debt service payments
can also act as a monitoring agent on firm managers. Moreover, it may be
that larger firms are more able to afford the large fixed costs associated
with issuing long-term debt. Accordingly, we hypothesize larger firms and
those with more property, plant and equipment will use more long-term
debt.
A summary of the variables and their associated calculations are
shown in Table 2. The full regression model used to test the hypotheses
is shown below:
LTDR = α0 + αDEP + α2EOO + α3PPE + α4SIZE + α5GO + εi
LTDR = The ratio of debt maturing in more than three years to total
assets.
DEP = The ratio of depreciation expense to total assets.
EOO = Firm risk as measured by the firm’s estimated Ohlson’s O score.
The calculation of the variable is explained in the Appendix.
PPE = The ratio of property, plant and equipment (net) to total assets.
SIZE = Firm size as measured by the natural log of total assets.
GO = A growth opportunity variable measured five different ways:
• MVA/BVA is the ratio of the market value of assets to book value of
assets. Market value of assets is calculated by taking the market
value of equity and adding total assets.
• E/P is the ratio of earnings per share to annual closing price per
share.
• MVE/BVE is the ratio of market value of equity to book value of
equity.
• CAP EXP/SALES is the ratio of capital expenditures to total sales.

•

CAP EXP/ASSETS is the ratio of capital expenditures to total
assets.

εi = the error term in the regression.
We utilize a pooled cross-section regression model that examines the
variables of interest across firms and over time. This is consistent with
many papers in the financial literature including those already discussed in
the literature review.
5. Results
The regression results for the entire sample are shown in Table 3. This
sample, as previously discussed, contains casino firms and casino hotel
firms. Variance inflation factors were calculated for all regressions and
there were no factors about 1.4, indicating a lack of multicollinearity.
However, because we are using a sample of firms that continues
from year to year, the possibility of serial correlation exists. As stated by
Myers (2001), debt ratios are “lumpy” in that they often remain similar from
year to year. Therefore, we added a lagged long-term debt ratio as an
independent variable and ran the autoreg procedure in SAS. When using
a lagged dependent variable as an independent variable, the normal
Durbin-Watson statistic is no longer valid. We ran Durbin’s h and t tests in
SAS which indicated no serial correlation after adding the lagged debt
ratio.
**insert table 3 here**
All models contain variables for depreciation, risk, PPE, size, lagged
debt ratio and a growth opportunity variable. The first model shows a
significant and positive relationship between long-term debt and risk.
There is also a significantly positive relationship between firm size and
long-term debt. The first model includes the ratio of market value of
assets to book value of assets as a growth opportunity variable, but it is
not significant.
The second regression model is very much the same as the first
model, except that the growth opportunity variable in the second model is
the ratio of earnings per share to price per share. The higher the ratio, the
fewer growth opportunities are expected by the market for that particular
firm. We find a highly significant and positive relationship with long-term
debt, indicating that casino firms with fewer growth opportunities use more
long-term debt. This finding also means that firms with greater growth
opportunities use less long-term debt. This is consistent with general

financial literature, but is contrary to some findings in the lodging industry
(Tang & Jang, 2007; Dalbor & Upneja, 2004).
The third regression model results are similar to the first two in terms
of size and risk. This model utilizes the ratio of market value of equity to
book value of equity as the growth opportunity variable, although it is
insignificant. The fourth model utilizes the ratio of capital expenditures to
sales as a growth opportunity variable, but it too is insignificant.
Finally, the fifth regression model utilizes the ratio of capital
expenditures to total assets to represent growth opportunities. The
relationship with long-term debt is highly significant and positive, which is
different from what we find in model two. However, it should be
considered that not all growth opportunities can be considered equal.
Some firms (pharmaceutical firms, for example) may exploit growth
opportunities through the buildup of intangible assets. The casino
industry, much like the lodging industry, is quite fixed asset intensive. The
growth opportunities in the casino business may be exploited through
expenditures on long-term assets. The use of long-term debt to finance
fixed assets is consistent with the literature explored by Walsh (1982).
The results for the entire sample fail to support the first hypothesis.
The results also fail to support hypothesis three. Hypothesis two (firm
risk) and hypothesis four (firm size) are supported by the results. In terms
of growth opportunities, the results are indeterminate because of the signs
of the E/P coefficient and the CAP EXP/ASSETS coefficients are both
positive.
**insert table 4 here**
Table 4 shows results for Casinos (excluding hotels). The results are
very similar to those in Table 3. The risk and size coefficients are positive
and highly significant in all models. The E/P coefficient is positive as in
the full sample, but only marginally significant for casinos. The MVE/BVE
coefficient is insignificant. The main difference between the results in
Tables 3 and 4 is that CAP EXP/ASSETS coefficient is not significant for
casinos. Once again, some of the growth opportunity variables provide a
conflicting story regarding growth opportunities and the use of long-term
debt.
In terms of support of our research hypotheses, the results for the
casino firms once again fail to support the first hypothesis. The results
also fail to support hypothesis three. Hypothesis two (firm risk) and
hypothesis four (firm size) are supported by the results. In terms of growth
opportunities, our expectation of hypothesis five is marginally rejected
because of the positive coefficient on the E/P variable.
**insert Table 5 here**

Table 5 displays the regression results for casino hotels. Once
again, the risk and firm size coefficients are all positive and highly
significant in all models. The results in this table are different from Tables
3 and 4 in terms of the depreciation coefficient. The first four models
show negative and significant coefficients for the depreciation variable.
The depreciation coefficient is negative and marginally significant in the
last model. This finding appears to lend some support to the tradeoff
theory in that casino hotels with more depreciation tend to use less longterm debt.
In terms of growth opportunities, casino hotels also display a
contradictory story. The E/P coefficient is positive and highly significant,
indicating firms with fewer growth opportunities use more long-term debt.
On the other hand, the CAP EXP/ASSETS coefficient is positive and
highly significant, indicating growth opportunities being positively
associated with long-term debt.
In terms of support of our research hypotheses, the results for the
casino hotel sample tend to support the tradeoff theory of the first
hypothesis. The results once again fail to support hypothesis three.
Hypothesis two (firm risk) and hypothesis four (firm size) are once again
supported by the results. Similar to the results for the entire sample, the
confirmation of hypothesis five is undetermined because the signs of the
E/P coefficient and the CAP EXP/ASSETS are both positive.
5. Conclusions and Implications
The purpose of this research is to test the use of long-term debt by casino
firms under the three major theories of capital structure. We examine
long-term debt use for all casino firms and subsequently divide the sample
into two subsamples, casino firms and casino hotel firms. The results are
nearly identical for the sample as a whole and casino firms. The
regression results show a positive relationship between risk and long-term
debt (supporting the pecking order theory) as well as a positive
relationship between firm size and long-term debt (supporting the free
cash flow theory). However, we did not find significant relationships
between depreciation expense and long-term debt and PPE investment
and long-term debt for both the entire sample and the casino firms
subsample. We are not surprised by the results for the depreciation
expense coefficient as the tradeoff theory seems to be losing credibility
among researchers as time goes on (Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1999). We
are surprised, however, by the lack of significance of the PPE coefficients
in all the regression models.

We also ran regressions for a casino hotel subsample. The results
were also very similar to the first two series of regressions. Both firm risk
and firm size are positively related to long-term debt. One major
difference was the significantly negative relationship between depreciation
expense and long-term debt in the first four models, thus lending some
credence to the trade-off theory of capital structure.
The common feature among all three sets of regression results is
somewhat puzzling. In all three sets of regressions (with varying degrees
of significance) there is a positive relationship between the earnings/price
ratio and long-term debt.
This indicates firms with fewer growth
opportunities use more long-term debt.
Conversely, two sets of
regressions show a positive and highly significant relationship between the
CAP EX/ASSETS ratio and long-term debt. Thus, this result indicates a
positive relationship between long-term debt and future growth.
The conflicting results can be seen as one motivation for doing this
paper. The growth opportunity explanation within the pecking order theory
of capital structure appears to be unclear. Perhaps this is to be expected
because as discussed by Myers (2001), capital structure theories are not
really meant to be generalized across industries. Even within the
hospitality industry there are differences. For example, Dalbor and Upneja
(2002) find a negative relationship between a growth opportunities longterm debt for the restaurant industry while Tang and Jang (2007) find a
positive relationship between growth opportunities and long-term debt for
the lodging industry.
The use of the earnings to price ratio may also be an imperfect
measure of growth opportunities. Firm earnings are accrual-based an
affected by special charges, one-time gains and losses and changes in
depreciation methods. They have also been the focus in recent years
regarding manipulation (Enron, for example). Additionally, the earnings
used in E/P ratios in the financial literature are historical while market
prices typically reflect future prospects for earnings and/or cash flows.
There may be other factors involved in the relationship between the
use of debt and growth opportunities. First, we have only examined the
use of long-term debt. The fact that construction lending is short-term (the
use of “bridge loans”, for example) may not be adequately addressed in
the current research design.
Furthermore, much like many other
businesses, the casino business is cyclical and subject to economic
fluctuations. For example, gaming revenue for metropolitan Las Vegas
declined more than 23 percent from 2007 to 2009 (The Center for
Economic and Business Research, 2010). This could impact a firm’s

ability and willingness to borrow funds. This can also vary from firm to firm
and potentially confound results.
There are a number of potential issues to be explored here. One
involves differences between hospitality industry sub-segments that could
be worth investigating. There could also be discrepancies involving the
time period of data being used. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, is
the appropriate measure of growth opportunities. There is yet no
consensus on which measure is best.
Although research and
development expenditures are often used as a proxy for firm growth in the
mainstream financial literature, these types of expenditures are typically
small or non-existent for many hospitality firms.
Thus, capital
expenditures are often used in place of research and development figures
in hospitality research.
Since most hospitality firms are fixed asset intensive, further
investigation into the true benefit of capital expenditures is warranted. In
other words, do hospitality firms that spend on capital improvements really
grow future earnings? If so, how much growth is there? These are just
two questions that could be answered by future hospitality researchers.
Appendix
The Original O-score (probability) of bankruptcy is calculated in the
following manner: First, we calculate the numerical value (NV) of the
probability of bankruptcy. The second step is to calculate the O-score that
represents the probability of bankruptcy.
NV = -1.249 - 0.211*SIZE +2.262*TLTA – 3.451*WCTA + 0.293*CLCA –
0.907*OENEG –1.08*NITA – 0.838*FUTL + 1.266*INTWO -0.96*CHIN
The O-Score ranges from 0 (extremely low probability of
bankruptcy) to 1 (indicating a 100% probability of bankruptcy). The
procedure for calculating the Revised O-score is based on the equation
below.
O-Score = 1/(1 + e-NV)
An explanation of the variables is shown below.
Variable
Calculation
SIZE
Log of total assets
TLTA
Total Liabilities/Total Assets
WCTA
Working Capital/Total Assets
CLCA
Current Liabilities/Current Assets
OENEG
If total liabilities > total assets, OENEG = 1
If total liabilities ≤ total assets, OENEG = 0
NITA
Net income or loss/Total Assets

FOTL
INTWO

Funds received from operations/total liabilities
If the firm has reported a net loss for the current
period AND the previous period INTWO =1; O
otherwise
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Table 1.
List of casino firms in complete sample.
Ameristar Casinos
Anchor Gaming
Archon Corporation
Argosy Gaming Company
Aztar Corporation
Ballys’ Grand Incorporated
Black Hawk Gaming and
Development
Boardwalk Casino
Boomtown Incorporated
Bouncebacktechnologies.com
Boyd Gaming
Caesars Entertainment
Caesars New Jersey
Caesars World
Capital Gaming International
Casino Magic Corporation
Century Casinos
Colorado Casino Resorts
Concorde Gaming Corporation
Diamondhead Casino Corporation
Elsinore Corporation
Empire Resorts Incorporated
Full House Resorts
Gaming Corporation of America
Gateway Casinos Income Fund
GB Holdings Incorporated
Global Casinos Incorporated
Great Canadian Gaming Corporation
Griffin Gaming and Entertainment
Harrah’s Entertainment
Harvey’s Casino Resorts

Holly Holdings Incorporated
Hollywood Casino Corporation
International Thoroughbred
Breeders
Isle of Capri Casinos
JCC Holding Company
Kerzner International Limited
Lady Luck Gaming Corporation
Lakes Entertainment Incorporated
Las Vegas Sands Corporation
Lottery and Waging Solutions
Mandalay Resort Group
Melco Crown Entertainment
MGM Mirage
Mirage Resorts Incorporated
Monarch Casino and Resort
Nevada Gold and Casinos
Oasis Resorts International
Pinnacle Entertainment
Players International Incorporated
Rio Hotel and Casino Incorporated
Riviera Holdings Corporation
Sahara Casino Partners
Sands Regent
Showboat Incorporated
Southwest Casino Corporation
Station Casinos Incorporated
Stratosphere Corporation
Thunderbird Resorts
Trump Entertainment Resorts
Wynn Resorts

Table 2.
Descriptive statistics for complete sample.
N
Mean
Standard
Minimum
(1)
Variable
Deviation
LTDR
492
0.31
0.33
-1.48
Depreciation
567
0.05
0.02
0.00
EOO
567
0.55
0.30
0.01
PPE
567
0.63
0.22
0.00
SIZE
567
5.52
2.03
0.62
MVA/BVA
567
1.59
1.09
0.23
Earnings/Price
562
-0.31
2.32
-36.13
MVE/BE
568
-0.15
59.45
-1410.10
Cap. Exp. / Sales 684
2.47
39.00
0
Cap. Exp. /Assets 699
0.09
0.09
0
(1)

Maximum
1.62
0.17
0.99
0.97
10.34
10.85
5.00
43.13
931.91
0.56

LTDR is the ratio of long-term debt (debt maturing in more than three
years) to total assets. Depreciation is the ratio of annual depreciation
expense to total assets. EOO is Ohlson’s Estimated O Score, a proxy for
firm risk that measures the probability of bankruptcy. PPE is the ratio of
property, plant and equipment (net) to total assets. Firm size is the natural
log of total assets. MVA/BVA is a growth opportunity variable, measuring
the market value of assets to the book value of assets. Earnings/Price is
a growth opportunity variable, measured by net income per share divided
by annual closing stock price. MVE/BE is a growth opportunity variable,
measured by the ratio of the market value of equity to book value of
equity. Cap. Exp/Sales and Cap. Exp./Assets are both growth opportunity
variables, utilizing the ratios of annual capital expenditures to total sales
and total assets, respectively.

Table 3.
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results for the Entire Sample

Sample
size

Intercept

DEP

EOO

PPE

SIZE

LAGDR

448

-0.379
(-5.21)***

-0.053
(-0.08)

0.000
(0.00)

0.074
(9.31)***

0.201
(4.55)***

443

-0.335
(-5.39)***

-0.707
(-1.17)

0.010
(0.15)

0.072
(9.59)***

0.215
(5.06)***

449

-0.309
(-4.85)***

-0.598
(-0.95)

0.018
(0.27)

0.070
(9.19)***

0.207
(4.74)***

511

-0.256
(-3.24)***

-0.383
(-0.49)

-0.078
(-0.95)

0.071
(7.43)***

0.223
(5.25)***

524

-0.314
(-4.43)***

0.348
(0.48)

0.333
(6.50)**
*
0.370
(7.49)**
*
0.329
(6.52)**
*
0.336
(6.00)**
*
0.306
(5.69)**
*

-0.074
(-0.96)

0.066
(7.46)***

0.252
(6.11)***

MVA
BVA

E/P

MVE
BVE

CAP
EXP
SALES

CAP
EXP
ASSETS

0.019
(1.49)

2

R
(%)
34.6

0.042
(6.23)***

39.2

-0.004
(-1.58)

34.9

-0.00
(-0.54)

25.4

0.534
(3.53)***

28.9

***Significant at 1 percent. **Significant at 5 percent. * Significant at 10 percent.
LTDR is the ratio of long-term debt (debt maturing in more than three years) to total assets. Depreciation is the ratio
of annual depreciation expense to total assets. EOO is Ohlson’s Estimated O Score, a proxy for firm risk that
measures the probability of bankruptcy. PPE is the ratio of property, plant and equipment (net) to total assets. SIZE
is the natural log of total assets. LAGDR is the long-term debt ratio, lagged one period. MVA/BVA is a growth
opportunity variable, measuring the market value of assets to the book value of assets. E/P is a growth opportunity
variable, measured by net income per share divided by annual closing stock price. MVE/BVE is a growth opportunity
variable, measured by the ratio of the market value of equity to book value of equity. CAP EXP/SALES and CAP
EXP/ASSETS are both growth opportunity variables, utilizing the ratios of annual capital expenditures to total sales
and total assets, respectively.

Table 4.
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results for Casinos (NAICS Code 713210)
Sample
size

Intercept

DEP

EOO

PPE

SIZE

LAGDR

169

-0.541
(-4.83)***

1.204
(1.13)

0.366
(4.06)***

0.032
(0.27)

0.088
(5.93)***

0.198
(2.49)**

165

-0.425
(-4.20)***

0.451
(0.44)

0.371
(4.19)***

0.036
(0.32)

0.082
(5.50)***

0.219
(2.71)***

173

-0.420
(-4.33)***

0.317
(0.33)

0.373
(4.28)***

0.317
(0.33)

0.084
(5.76)***

0.211
(2.71)***

187

-0.415
(-3.23)**

0.900
(0.66)

0.401
(3.69)***

-0.033
(-0.22)

0.086
(4.69)***

0.182
(2.23)**

195

-0.429
(3.67)***

1.753
(1.34)

0.341
(3.27)***

-0.033
(-0.23)

0.076
(4.19)***

0.238
(3.00)**

MVA
BVA
0.037
(1.60)

E/P

MVE
BVE

CAP EXP
SALES

CAP EXP
ASSETS

2

R
(%)
39.9

0.069
(1.79)*

38.9
-0.007
(1.62)

39.9

-0.000
(-0.34)

27.6
0.414
(1.44)

30.8

***Significant at 1 percent. **Significant at 5 percent. * Significant at 10 percent.

LTDR is the ratio of long-term debt (debt maturing in more than three years) to total assets. Depreciation is the ratio
of annual depreciation expense to total assets. EOO is Ohlson’s Estimated O Score, a proxy for firm risk that
measures the probability of bankruptcy. PPE is the ratio of property, plant and equipment (net) to total assets. SIZE
is the natural log of total assets. LAGDR is the long-term debt ratio, lagged one period. MVA/BVA is a growth
opportunity variable, measuring the market value of assets to the book value of assets. E/P is a growth opportunity
variable, measured by net income per share divided by annual closing stock price. MVE/BVE is a growth opportunity
variable, measured by the ratio of the market value of equity to book value of equity. CAP EXP/SALES and CAP
EXP/ASSETS are both growth opportunity variables, utilizing the ratios of annual capital expenditures to total sales
and total assets, respectively.

Table 5.
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results for Casino Hotels (NAICS Code 721120)
Sample
size

Intercept

DEP

EOO

PPE

SIZE

LAGDR

MVA
BVA

272

-0.133
(-1.05)

-2.27
(-2.46)**

0.284
(4.67)***

-0.037
-0.32)

0.064
(6.77)***

0.156
(2.96)***

-0.003
(-0.21)

271

-0.176
(-1.63)

-2.282
(-2.84)**

0.368
(6.32)***

-0.056
(-0.52)

0.066
(7.67)***

0.178
(3.63)***

269

-0.136
(-1.16)

-2.308
(-2.57)**

0.287
(4.70)***

-0.036
(-0.31)

0.064
(7.00)***

0.156
(2.98)***

317

-0.086
(-0.67)

-2.418
(-2.38)**

0.258
(4.20)***

-0.034
(-0.29)

0.058
(5.22)***

0.207
(4.31)***

322

-0.154
(-1.36)

-1.581
(-1.80)*

(0.253
(4.30)***

-0.080
(-0.72)

0.059
(6.24)***

0.214
(4.64)***

E/P

2

MVE
BVE

CAP EXP
SALES

CAP EXP
ASSETS

R
(%)
33.4

0.039
(6.49)***

42.0
-0.001
(-0.14)

33.8
-0.00
(-0.11)

26.6
0.520
(3.13)***

30.4

***Significant at 1 percent. **Significant at 5 percent. * Significant at 10 percent.
LTDR is the ratio of long-term debt (debt maturing in more than three years) to total assets. Depreciation is the ratio
of annual depreciation expense to total assets. EOO is Ohlson’s Estimated O Score, a proxy for firm risk that
measures the probability of bankruptcy. PPE is the ratio of property, plant and equipment (net) to total assets. SIZE
is the natural log of total assets. LAGDR is the long-term debt ratio, lagged one period. MVA/BVA is a growth
opportunity variable, measuring the market value of assets to the book value of assets. E/P is a growth opportunity
variable, measured by net income per share divided by annual closing stock price. MVE/BVE is a growth opportunity
variable, measured by the ratio of the market value of equity to book value of equity. CAP EXP/SALES and CAP
EXP/ASSETS are both growth opportunity variables, utilizing the ratios of annual capital expenditures to total sales
and total assets, respectively.

